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Abstract 
Interests continue to grow in recent years for the 
adoption of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in 
many different areas including transportation and 
supply chain management. Those RFID-included 
objects can be targeted more efficiently by real-time 
tracking and instant management. However, because 
of the contact-less type of RFID remote retrieval, the 
transmission of data in the air is very vulnerable to 
eavesdropping or appropriation. A primary security 
concern surrounding RFID technology is the illicit 
tracking of consumer location and analyzing of their 
shopping habits or behavior. 
This paper proposes a more secure and 
lightweight RFID variation protection protocol which 
enhances the security of the transmission of 
information as well as the consumer privacy protection 
by using randomized control access and two-way 
identification. In addition, this protocol also improves 
the overall performance and lowers the cost of RFID 
tag without any complicated calculation. 
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1. Introduction 
RFID is an automatic identification method, relying on 
storing and remotely retrieving data using RFID tags. 
RFID system may consist of several components: 
RFID tags, RFID readers, edge servers, middleware, 
and application software. An RFID tag is a small 
device contain silicon chips and antennas that can be 
attached to or incorporated into any object. Passive 
tags require no internal power source, whereas active 
tags require a power source [3, 8]. 
Because of the contact-less type of RFID remote 
retrieval, the transmission of data in the air is very 
vulnerable to eavesdropping or appropriation. In 
addition, unique means of identification in each RFID 
tag such as Electronic Product Code (EPC) [5] allows 
easy tracking of the movement of persons and goods. 
Moreover, even if the responses of tags are encrypted, 
the owner can also be identified and tracked by the 
fixed encrypted code [6]. 
It is expected that RFID system will carve a place 
for itself and become widespread in all areas. It will 
have a great impact on the way we work and live [12]. 
However, the excessive use of RFID readers can also 
turn into closely connected monitoring networks that 
collect all kinds of information including tracking of 
the movement of goods as well as identifying and 
analyzing personal information [1, 9 and 10]. For the 
long-term growth of RFID system, it is critical that the 
system can provide a mechanism which will address 
the issues of personal privacy, security, and identity 
theft. 
2. Related works 
There have been some approaches to the security and 
privacy issues in RFID system. The approaches can be 
classified into four categories. 
 
Disable tags totally or partially 
To protect consumer privacy, checkout clerks would 
“kill” the tags of purchased goods before they are 
placed in the hands of consumers; no purchased goods 
would contain active RFID tags [2, 4 and 10]. 
But it is difficult to ensure that the kill command 
was properly executed. In addition, partially disable or 
rewrite tag can not prevent being tracked as tags 
respond to a fixed output. 
 
Blocker tags 
The RSA Blocker Tag technology uses a jamming 
system designed to confuse RFID readers and prevent 
those devices from tracking data on individuals or 
goods outside certain boundaries [10]. It cannot be 
used, for example, to circumvent theft-control systems 
or mount denial-of-service (DoS) attacks – only to 
protect the privacy of law-abiding consumers. 
But this kind of solution, only may achieve in the 
limited safeguard for consumers. It needs consumer's 
initial cooperation and voluntary purchase of the 
equipment. In other words, they do not deal 
thoroughly with the problems of security and privacy. 
Fig. 1: Dirk’s Hash-based ID variation protocol procedure [7] 
Hash Lock 
With Hash lock, tags only respond to authorized 
readers. Fixed hash lock stands for an authentication 
process in which the authentication key is fixed. This 
scheme offers privacy control at a low cost. All it 
requires is a hash function and storage for RFID tag’s 
ID. Every reference to RFID tag data was stored in 
back-end database [4, 11 and 13]. 
However, it can not prevent being tracked, 
because tags respond predictably. 
 
Randomized Hash Lock 
Randomized Hash Lock is an extension of hash lock 
type scheme which uses random number function. 
Instead of fixed metal ID, RFID tag’s response 
changes with each query. This prevents illegal RFID 
readers to locate the consumer’s position through the 
fixed value of RFID tag [6, 7 and 13]. 
Among those solutions deploying the Randomized 
Hash Lock approach, the Hash-based ID variation 
protocol proposed by Dirk is most popular, as shown 
in Figure 1. 
3. LCID variation 
The Randomized Hash Lock approach provides better 
protection against the security and privacy problems 
among the four solutions discussed earlier. However, 
the high complexity of computation and procedures is 
not suitable for the low-cost RFID implementation. 
This study proposes a more secure and lightweight 
RFID variation protection protocol which is the 
Low-Cost Identification variation (LCID variation) 
protocol, to resolve this issue. 
3.1. Initial Setup 
The size of storing the capacity is one of the important 
factors to influence the RFID tag cost. Therefore, the 
objective of this study is to design a protection 
mechanism that reduces the amount of data fields 
contained in RFID tags and so the cost can be reduced.  
The necessary field of LCID variation protocol is 
defined as follows: 
 
Each RFID tag needs to contain fields for the 
following entries: 
- RFID tag’s ID (“ID”) 
read only 
- RFID reader’s ID (“RID”) 
read only, optionally writable 
- Additional fields for user data or a master key 
are conceivable but not required at all 
 
Each RFID reader needs to contain fields for the 
following entries: 
- RFID reader’s ID (“RID”) 
read only 
- Random number (“RND”) 
read / write 
 
The DB needs to contain a table with the following 
entries for each record row: 
- RFID tag’s ID (“ID”), acting as primary index 
of the table 
- A reference to tag data / user data (“DATA”) 
read / write 
 
Each RFID reader has an unique reader 
identification (RID), and each RFID tag stores an 
authorized RID to measure the target of 
communication. RID is used to prevent illegal RFID 
readers collecting data illegally to analyze consumer’s 
shopping habits. RND is a random number to protect 
all of transmission of data and to prevent replay attack. 
When the RFID tag is embedded into the product 
and shipped, the data in database should be written 
into the RFID tag containing related product records 
for further access and queries. 
Fig. 2: Low-Cost ID variation protocol procedure 
3.2. Normal Operation 
There are five steps in the low-cost dynamic RFID 
security protocol. Figure 2 depicts the brief flow. 
 
1. RFID reader generates a random number RND, 
and sends a query (RID⊕RND) to RFID tag. 
2. RFID tag performs a XOR manipulation on the 
received (RID⊕RND) and its authorized RID; 
thus achieves the original RND. And then, it 
returns the value ID⊕ (RND+1) to the RFID 
reader. 
3. RFID reader performs a XOR manipulation on 
the received ID⊕(RND+1) and its (RND+1); thus 
obtains the original ID. And then, it uses the ID 
the query the back-end system. 
4. According the above ID, the back-end system 
accesses the related product information from the 
database, and returns to RFID reader. In this stage, 
the ordinary procedure is completed. 
5. This step happens only when the RFID reader 
requests re-authorization. In this situation, RFID 
reader uses the New_RID (new reader 
identification) to compute the (New_RID)⊕RID
⊕(RND+2), and sends the value to RFID tag. 
When RFID tag receives the message, it 
sequentially performs a XOR manipulation on the 
received (New_RID) ⊕ RID ⊕ (RND+2), its 
(RND+2), and RID. The result obtained is the 
newly authorized New_RID. The RFID tag can 
overwrite the old RID by the obtained New_RID, 
and completes the re-authorization procedure. 
4. Analysis for LCID variation 
In the following, the LCID variation and Hash-based 
ID variation are compared briefly: 
 
Identification: each RFID tag gets an authorized 
“RID” which can access the RFID reader data. Thus, 
RID can protect the data transmitted by RFID tags 
from being read by unauthorized RFID readers. In 
compute the RNDs which is used to discriminate a real 
tag. Therefore, the RFID tag and reader can 
discriminate each others and achieve the “Two-way 
identification”. On the other hands, the Hash-Based ID 
variation protocol only provides “One-way 
identification” for RFID tags; it cannot discriminate 
the reality of a RFID reader. 
 
addition, fake tags cannot obtain RID, and IDs to 
ecurity: The RFID reader randomly generates a 
rivacy: Employing random numbers makes the data 
PC compatibility: The RFID tag contains a fixed 
ommunication performance: This work (LCID 
S
RND number at each communication. RND can be 
used to protect transmitted data, ensure the 
communication privacy, and avoid replay attacks. On 
the other hand, Hash-Based ID variation protocol 
deploys one-way hashing to protect the transmitted 
data with higher computation complexity and data 
loading. 
 
P
transmitted by RFID tags get a non-fixed value that is 
unpredictable, and thus can protect the consumer’s 
location from being traced. On the other hand, 
Hash-Based ID variation changes the RFID tag 
identification code after each data access. 
 
E
identification number; which is compatible with EPC 
network. The product related information could be 
queried via ONS in EPC network. Hash-based ID 
variation changes the RFID tag identification code 
after each data access, and thus is not compatible with 
EPC network that uses single ID number. 
 
C
variation) simplifies the communication flows and 
data transmission. There are two types of reading 
flows in LCID variation protocol: (1) In the ordinary 
flow, only four times of message passing are needed. 
(2) In case there is a need to be re-authorized, it takes 
five times of message passing. In both types, only one 
single data should be transmitted at each step. 
Therefore, it retains good performance in the 
environment where considerable RFID tags access the 
network simultaneously. On the other side, Hash-based 
ID variation always takes five times of message 
passing, and multiple packets of data are sent out in 
each message passing. Obviously, this protocol can 
bring down the overall performance. 
 
Cost: There are two significant cost components for 
Table 1 describes the above analysis. 
 
able 1: Comparative and analysis 
the RFID tag: the computation ability and storage 
space. These two components are simplified in our 
security protection mechanism. Because LCID 
variation deploys only the less-complicated XOR 
computation, the RFID tag does not need complicated 
computation capabilities and storage spaces. On the 
other hand, the RFID tag must handle multiple hashing 
functions and XOR computation in Hash-based ID 
variation. In addition, it must store both the old and 
current record, and thus increases the space demand by 
two folds. 
 
T
 
Hash-based
ID Variation
Low-Cost ID
Variation
Identification One-way Two-way
Security Yes Yes
Privacy Yes Yes
EPC compatibility No Yes
Procedure Complex Simple
Calculate Complex Simple
DB record 2 Records 1 Record
Expand capability Yes Better
D
ata
Perform
ance
 
5. Conclusion 
In recent years, the RFID has been widely adopted in 
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many different fields at an increasing rate. Yet, the 
issues of security and privacy have become the key 
challenges in promoting the RFID technology. Each of 
the existing four categories of solutions has its merits 
and pitfalls. The objective of this research is to 
propose a secured and lightweight protection protocol 
to resolve these issues. 
This research propo
rity protocol, which deploys a randomized 
protection and two-way identification mechanism. 
This protocol can provide better protection for data 
transmission and consumer privacy. In addition, the 
protocol has an advantage in terms of data 
transmission performance over other protocols as it 
does not require encryption technology. Moreover, the 
protocol lowers the RFID tag costs and is compatible 
with the existing EPC network. This research 
demonstrates a new and effective low-cost RFID 
protocol that can be implemented and introduced to a 
consumer market that operates in high security 
environments. 
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